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1. Introduction: focus of the paper 
 
Following the adoption of the MDG, particulary the first one that is to reduce poverty by half 
between 1995 and 2015, numerous studies have examined how external aid can contribute to 
their achievement. The formula "doubling aid to reduce the poverty by half" relied on the 
implicit assumption that aid was an effective instrument for poverty reduction. The formula 
and corresponding assumption have of course been debated. Two opposite views have clearly 
appeared, one, well represented by Jeffrey Sachs in his End of Poverty, underlining the need 
for a big push to get low income countries out of poverty traps, the other one, exemplified by 
the attacks of William Easterly against aid, a big push and the idea itself of a poverty trap, but 
also including arguments about a limited absorptive capacity. Elsewhere we have argued that 
the absorptive capacity of aid depends on aid modalities and can be enhanced by a reform of 
aid, a point to which we will come back to later (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 
2007). 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the main reasons how aid can contribute to poverty 
reduction, the channels through which it can do so and the lessons of the literature on these 
issues,  with  a  special  focus  on  the  way  aid  can  address  the  vulnerability  faced  by  many 
developing countries.  
 
Focus on macroeconomic rather than microeconomic analyses of aid effectiveness 
 
Aid effectiveness studies reveal a micro-macro paradox (already noted by Mosley in 1987), as 
found in other fields (education, health, etc.). Consideration of specific projects or operations 
financed  by  aid  most  often  leads  to  a  positive  appreciation  of  their  results,  whereas  the 
macroeconomic studies of aid effects seem to lead to more nuanced results. The paradox may 
result from the methodological pitfalls of the macroeconomic studies, or of, less frequently 
stressed,  microeconomic  ones.  For  instance  it  could  result  from  negative  externalities 
generated by aid specific projects, not captured by microeconomic studies. But, as we shall 
see, aid projects are also likely to generate positive externalities, not easily captured at the 
micro level.  
 
Here we focus on macroeconomic and cross-sectional studies of the contribution of aid to 
poverty reduction. Although very numerous,  country regressions used to test the effect of aid 
on any variable have been highly criticized for their inability to take the heterogeneity of the 
country  situations  into  account  (Bourguignon  and  Leipziger,  2007).  But  an  appropriate 
specification of the models used, including conditional and non-linear effects, may address 
this issue to some extent. The quality of statistics, as well as the relevance of the aid concept, 
is often also criticized, and it is clearly for improvements. As we shall see, the most critical 
issue is the treatment of aid endogeneity. In any case, cross sectional macro-economic studies 
are needed to suggest  general lessons on aid effectiveness, which cannot be delivered by  
micro-economic studies, regardless of  their usefulness in other respects. 
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Assessing aid effectiveness: from growth to poverty  
 
The impact of aid on economic growth has been largely debated in recent years. Most cross-
country econometric studies of aid effectiveness have focused on economic growth. Indeed 
growth  of  income  per  capita  is,  on  a  cross-sectional  basis,  the  most  easily  available  and 
measurable summary indicator of economic outcomes. Consequently, the effects of aid on 
poverty  reduction  have  been  mainly  investigated  through  the  effect  of  aid  on  economic 
growth, in relation to a (supposed) given income elasticity of poverty (e.g. Collier and Dollar, 
2001, 2002). Besides its effect on poverty through the rate of growth, aid may have either a 
direct impact on poverty for a given level of income growth or an impact on the income 
elasticity of poverty. 
 
Almost  never  has  the  impact  of  aid  on  poverty  measured  by  the  traditional  indices  of 
monetary  income  poverty  such  as  the  headcount  index  or  the  poverty  gap  been  directly 
examined
1. Is the difficulty in gathering comparable estimates of poverty change enough to 
explain this strange missing? Some studies have considered the effect of aid on the change in 
the level of another summary indicator of development or of welfare, such as the Human 
Development Index (Boone 1995; Kosack, 2003; Gomanee et al., 2005a, 2005b), identifying 
aid effectiveness as its ability to improve the overall quality of life. Some authors have also 
looked for the impact of aid on the level of a specific indicator of human development, for 
instance  infant  mortality  (Gomanee  et  al.,  2005;  Mosley  and  Suleiman  2007)  or  child 
mortality/survival (Burnside and Dollar 1998) or the school enrolment ratio (Michaelowa and 
Weber 2007, Dreher et al. 2008). Others have more specifically considered the impact on 
some  well-being  indicators  of  the  poorest  quintile  of  the  population.  Often  studies  have 
controlled for the effect of income (growth), trying to dissociate what is due to income and 
what is not.  
 
Need to consider the various channels, direct and indirect 
 
In this paper we present an overview of the state of knowledge of the various channels by 
which aid can influence the level of poverty. Three main macroeconomic channels of aid 
effectiveness for poverty reduction, each with its own lags, can be distinguished.  
 
The first, traditional channel is from aid to growth and from growth to poverty reduction. 
Both relationships have been debated, the first identified with “aid effectiveness”, the second, 
related to the income elasticity of poverty has been raised more recently.  
 
The second channel involves the impact of aid on the volume and composition of mainly 
social  public  expenditures,  particularly  on  education  and  health,  and  the  impact  of  these 
expenditures on corresponding poverty indicators. The impact of aid may involve its total 
amount  or  its  social  expenditures  allocation,  which  raises  a  problem  of  fungibility.  The 
various kinds of public expenditures likely to be influenced by aid have different effects on 
poverty reduction. Thus, we have to disentangle lessons from the literature on how aid can 
influence the structure of public spending in favour of the poor. Special attention will be paid 
to the kinds of conditionality attached to aid given in the form of budget support (section 3).  
 
Macro vulnerability issues.  
 
                                                 
1Exceptions are found in Mosley and Suleiman, 2007, who consider the impact of aid on a rather limited and 
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Last  but  not  least  a  third  channel,  neglected  in  the  literature,  has  been  linked  to  the 
macroeconomic stabilizing effect of aid, as suggested in several previous works. We argue 
that, to a large extent, the effect of aid on economic growth, and the contribution of growth to 
poverty reduction, are linked to their stabilizing impacts. By making growth less volatile, aid 
both  accelerates  growth  and  makes  it  more  pro-poor.  We  also  suggest,  but  with  more 
equivocal findings, that this double stabilizing effect on poverty may be supplemented by a 
third  one,  as  public  expenditures  are  influenced  by  macro  economic  instability.  Paying  a 
special attention to macro-vulnerability issues is needed for an analysis of aid effectiveness 
focused on poverty, particularly in the present world economic context (section 4). 
 




             
 
The growth-poverty channel 
 
 
For several decades, there was conflicting evidence in the macroeconomic literature on aid 
effectiveness, which was essentially related to growth, savings and investment (for a survey 
on  the  “old”    and  “new”  literature  see  Guillaumont  1985,  Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont 
Jeanneney 2006, Amprou and Chauvet 2007, Tarp 2006, Thorbecke 2000, …). As for the 
growth channels through which aid can reduce poverty two questions should be considered: 
What is the impact of aid on growth? What is the impact of growth on poverty? The answer to 
the first question, to a large extent depends on some specific features of recipient countries. 
The answer to the second one depends on the income elasticity of poverty. 
 
The aid-growth relationship: where do we stand?  
 
In the late 1990 was a water shed in the literature of aid effectiveness, from the circulation 
and publication of the paper by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000), and the debate which 
followed. Compared to the previous cross-country literature, the new one was led to consider 
that the effects of aid are heterogeneous, since they can depend on some characteristics of the 
recipient countries and on the level of aid they receive. These “non linearities” in the aid-
growth relationship were captured 
- in the first case by adding to the aid explanatory variable a multiplicative variable (aid x the 
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- in the second case by adding the squared aid variable (with an expected negative coefficient, 
so that beyond a threshold the marginal return of aid becomes negative).  
 
The most innovative aspect of the Burnside-Dollar paper was to assess aid effectiveness by a 
way where it depends on specific features of the recipient countries. Its most debatable aspect 
was to consider the country policy as the only such feature.  
 
The ABCD paradigm: aid effectiveness depending (only) on policy factors; 
 
Research was focused on the policy and institutional factors conditioning aid effectiveness. 
Burnside  and  Dollar  (1997,  2000)  made  effectiveness  depending  on  an  indicator  of 
macroeconomic policy, an average of indicators of openness (the Sachs and Warner index), of 
fiscal  balance  and  of  monetary  stability.  For  the  consistency  of  their  analysis,  they  also 
assumed that aid had no effect on policy, involving the inefficiency of conditionality. Their 
thesis was disseminated through the World Bank book Assessing Aid, where the same policy 
indicator was used. 
 
 The next step, Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), aimed at designing an optimal aid allocation 
among countries in order to minimize the number of the poor in the world. These two papers 
used  another  concept  and  measurement  of  policy,  the  “Country  Policy  and  Institutional 
Assessment” (CPIA) index, reflecting Bank staff opinions on the recipient countries
2 used for 
the allocation of IDA funds. Their model of the estimation of the aid-growth relationship 
included  the  squared  value  of  the  aid  variable  (negative  coefficient),  so  that  decreasing 
marginal returns to aid could lead to an “optimal allocation”.  
 
The  third  step  measures  the  “selectivity”  of  the  donors  in  their  aid  allocation,  selectivity 
assessed mainly with regard to the assumed quality of policy (using the CPIA or another 
indicator). This “ABCD paradigm” (for Assessing, Burnside, Collier, Dollar), has been very 
influential in donors, bilateral as well as multilateral aid policies (see Dollar and Levin, 2004, 
for instance). This influence may have been the result of a policy choice (“to help the good 
guys”), rather than of a real consensus on the factors determining aid effectiveness, which 
have remained highly moot. 
 
The paradigm criticized  
 
The aid-growth relationship has been extensively debated. Several kinds of criticism of the 
ABCD paradigm have been presented.  
 
First, the analysis is based on the assumption that aid does not influence economic policies 
and institutions of the receiving country. Relying on case studies launched by the World Bank 
(Devarajan et al. 2002), the research to support this thesis has instead reached more nuanced 
conclusions. 
 
Second, measurement of the quality of policies and institutions seemed too narrow in the first 
papers  of  Burnside  and  Dollar  and  then  too  subjective  through  the  CPIA,  with  circular 
reasoning (policies are likely to be considered as good when results are fine, particularly when 
aid is successful). Using one or another index of policy and institutional quality could result in 
quite different assessments of selectivity (Amprou et al. 2007). 
                                                 
2 The CPIA is a composite index from sixteen components covering four areas (related respectively to economic 
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There  was  also  some  discussion  of  the  time  and  space  dimensions  of  the  econometric 
estimations. Referring to six four year periods (over 1970-93), while increasing the number of 
observations, only allowed the authors to capture short or medium term effects (Clemens et al. 
2004). A major debate was related to the country sample of Burnside and Dollar, criticized in 
particular by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), who discussed the elimination of outliers. Easterly 
et  al.  (2004)  extended  both  the  period  and  the  sample  covered,  then  using  exactly  the 
methodology of Burnside and Dollar they no longer found their results.
3 Actually studies 
considering all kinds of developing countries, including a number where aid is negligible, 
may lead to biased estimates when the effect of aid is supposed to be conditional on another 
variable.  
 
More generally, specification of the model and the robustness of the econometric results have 
been cast in doubt, particularly by Hansen and Tarp (2001), who found a non-conditional 
positive impact of aid on growth
4. Comparing the econometric robustness of several aid-
growth regression studies, Roodman (2007a, 2007b) ranked Burnside and Dollar rather lowly. 
 
Finally  the  works  constituting  the  core  of  the  ABCD  paradigm  encountered  the  typical 
difficulties of all cross-sectional studies of aid effects, the measurement of aid itself (Clemens 
et al. 2004) and the possible endogeneity of aid. 
 
Other factors conditioning aid effectiveness  
 
Using cross-sectional approach to the aid-growth relationship, but in a broader context than 
that retained in the ABCD paradigm, several authors have examined factors likely to improve 
aid  effectiveness.  The  heterogeneity  of  the  relationship  has  been  addressed  in  three  main 
ways. 
 
First, by breaking down the sample into more homogeneous components, particularly to focus 
on low income countries or on Sub Sahara: only few papers have done it (see for instance 
Ram 2004, still considering how aid effectiveness depends on policy, for a focus on low 
income  countries




Second, the approach to heterogeneity is to consider that aid effectiveness depends on the 
level of aid itself. This issue has been mainly addressed with regard to possible decreasing 
marginal returns to aid, evidenced by the positive coefficient of the aid variable combined 
with  the  negative  coefficient  of  its  squared  value.  Several  studies  had  found  such  results 
(beginning by Burnside and Dollar 2000, Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002, Hansen and Tarp 
2000, 2001, Lensink and White 2000), with a corresponding threshold where the marginal 
contribution of aid to growth becomes nil, which reflects limited absorptive capacity for aid. 
Besides, an upper threshold due to absorptive capacity, there may be also a minimum level of 
aid  needed  for  effectiveness,  justifying  the  need  for  a  “big  push”  (Gomanee  et  al  2003, 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2007). New measures suggest the coexistence of 
such thresholds (Wagner 2008).  
                                                 
3 Burnside and Dollar (2004) responded, arguing that expanding the sample explains the change in the results.  
4 See also Morrissey (2001) and Lensink and White (2001). Guillaumont et Chauvet (2001) working with longer 
periods (twelve years) could not find a significant coefficient for the interactive variable between aid  and policy. 
5 They find more significant results for the sub-sample of low income countries. 








































1CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.17 
 
  9 
 
A third, by adding a multiplicative variable so that the aid variable, in the model, is multiplied 
by a variable on which its effectiveness is supposed to depend. The ABCD model may be 
seen as a special case. For instance Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001); argue that a major 
factor conditioning aid effectiveness in recipient countries is the economic vulnerability they 
face
7. We examine this view later in more details. In another paper, looking for a variety of 
factors likely to influence marginal aid effectiveness, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) have 
found the following: aid effectiveness simultaneously depends positively on the quality of 
present policy (ABCD hypothesis), negatively on the previous level of policy (support for 
catching up), positively on economic vulnerability (insurance effect, see below), negatively 
on  political  instability  (as  also  found  by  Islam,  2005),  positively  on  an  index  said  of 
absorptive capacity combining infrastructure and education
8. However, Gomanee et al. (2003)  
found  the  level  of  education  as  a  factor  of  lower  aid  effectiveness  (higher  marginal 
productivity of the transfer of knowledge associated with aid). Still other factors conditioning 
aid effectiveness have been suggested in the literature such as geographical location (distance 
from the Equator in Dalgaard et al. 2004)
9, are not necessarily enlightening
10. Actually, as 
noted above, when the effect of aid is conditional on another variable, the results may be 
highly sensitive to the extent of the country sample: it is the case if the countries receiving 
nearly no aid or an exceptionally high level of aid are also on the queue of the distribution for 
the conditional variable.  
 
 
Needed,  but  more  difficult  is  to  combine  the  two  previous  methods  of  treatment  of  the 
heterogeneity, so that marginal aid effectiveness both depends on the level of aid and on some 
characteristics of the recipient countries. It is easily conceivable that the thresholds (for big 
push  and  absorptive  capacity)  differ  according  these  characteristics,  but  estimations  are 
almost non-existent (except for Wagner 2008).  
 
Issues to address 
 
Following  criticism  of  the  ABCD  paradigm,  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  disregard  the 
findings of all the aid-growth cross country regressions, and of any new attempt of this kind.  
 
First, heterogeneity is considered too strong to allow such cross-sectional treatment. We have 
noted above that improvements in the treatment of heterogeneity are conceivable, in so far as 
comparative data are available. 
 
 “Meta-analyses” of aid-growth regressions are used to support for agnosticism (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam 2005a, 2005b and 2006). Such studies, comparing nearly one hundred of studies 
and the several hundreds regressions they contain, treat all of them in the same way, often 
without considering the quality of the estimations, and are quite less appropriate to compare 
the “conditional” results. They seem more relevant as a tool of political science, to explain the 
factors influencing the authors, than a basis for an economic diagnostic. 
 
                                                 
7 See in Annex more detailed results  
8 Id. 
9 A relationship shown by Roodman (2007a) to be dependent on outliers (Jordan), and also criticized by Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005).  
10 Other variables are considered in the literature as possibly conditioning aid effectiveness, such as social capital  
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A real problem is in the measurement of aid itself. The concept of net ODA flows, set for four 
decades by OECD and used in most of the papers, obscures its heterogeneous composition, 
including elements which do not correspond to a transfer to “recipient countries” (e.g. the cost 
of “sponsored” foreign students)
11. Figures for real disbursements in the countries are not yet 
available for long time series. A close issue is related to the possible need of disaggregating 
aid flows and considering their impact on various time horizons (as done by Clemens et al 
2004, then by Reddy and Minoiu 2006). 
 
The most difficult issue is probably the endogeneity of aid variables in growth regressions. 
This has been addressed by using instrumental variables: the relevant instruments should be 
correlated with the explanatory variable, aid, but not with the explained variable, growth, 
otherwise than through the instrumented variable, aid. But these instrumental varaibles are 
difficult to find, and those used have been moot. The most frequently used ones are those 
proposed  by  Tavares  (2003),  themselves  debated  because  of  their  fixity.  New  and  more 
relevant aid instruments can be found in other works related to growth and other variables 
(Brun  et  al.  2008,  Guillaumont  and  Laajaj,  2006).  However  the  possibility  to  adequately 
address the aid endogeneity issue has been challenged by Roodman (2007b, 2008). A recent 
paper by Deaton (2009) discusses the limits of the process of instrumentation in the case of 
aid-growth regressions without considering the various attempts to address the issue.  
 
Finally general criticisms obscure lessons which can be drawn from the most robust analyses 
of aid effectiveness for economic growth, which rely on relevant hypotheses on the effects of 
aid, use acceptable instruments for aid and control variables, and estimate the conditional 
effects of aid.  There are reasonable cross sectional ground to support the view that aid is 
likely to contribute to growth, particularly in specific circumstances. Part 5 highlights how 
vulnerability matters in this regard.  
  
   
Is the income elasticity of poverty independent of aid? 
 
If  foreign  aid  has  a  positive  impact  on  growth  and  if  growth  reduces  poverty,  such  aid 
contributes to poverty reduction. For a given impact of aid on the growth rate, its impact on 
poverty depends on the income elasticity of poverty. Here, poverty refers to the headcount 
index of poverty (number of people under the poverty line as a percent of the population). 
Simple versions consider elasticity as given and identical for all developing countries, while 
in more elaborated versions, specific elasticities are found for each country, depending on its 
domestic characteristics. Full assessment of the channel implies to considering how aid can 
influence the income elasticity of poverty.  
 
When elasticity is supposed to be uniform 
 
To be consistent with the works referred to, we presume that aid only contributes to poverty 
reduction through economic growth: in their influential model Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) 
consider that aid reduces poverty only by its impact on growth  and according to a given and 
uniform income elasticity of poverty. Collier and Dollar thus sought to determine the optimal 
inter-country allocation of aid that would reduce greatest the number of the poor in the world. 
The  optimal  allocation  among  countries  then  depends  on  the  quality  of  their  respective 
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policies  (conditioning  growth  effectiveness  of  aid,  with  decreasing  marginal  returns,  as 
discussed  above),  on  the  income  elasticity  of  poverty  (assumed  to  be  identical  among 
countries and equal to 2), and on the initial number of poor in each country. The optimal 
allocation, resulting in a minimum headcount index of poverty at the world level, is obtained 
by allocating more to countries with good policies and a high number of poor (due to the 
initial headcount index, and to population size as well). Since it would lead to allocating too 
much to India, a cap was put on allocations to India. 
 
Using another approach, the Millennium Project and other authors sought to determine the 
amount of aid needed to reduce the index of monetary poverty (headcount index) by half in 
each  country  (from  1995  to  2015).  It  can  be  implemented  with  various  aid-growth 
relationships and an income elasticity of poverty either unique or varying by country. For a 
given elasticity and an aid-growth model à la Collier and Dollar, the aid allocation needed to 
meet the MDG1 is then higher the worse the quality of policy (Anderson and Waddington 
2007). Thus, according to the two approaches the quality of policy influences “optimal” aid 
allocation in opposite directions.
12   
 
Domestic factors influencing elasticity  
 
In their study on how much is required to achieve MDG 1, the reduction by half of poverty at 
the country level, Anderson and Waddington (2007)  refer (without more explanation) to 
elasticity measures for each country, as drawn from a paper by Datt (1998). Indeed we can 
expect  this  elasticity  varying  according  to  the  income  distribution  of  each  country,  and 
income per capita in each country
 13. So any estimate of the impact of aid on poverty through 
the growth channel should include a discussion of factors underlying the income elasticity of 
poverty. 
 
As shown by Bourguignon (2003), the absolute value of this (negative) elasticity (sometimes 
called the growth elasticity of poverty) mechanically depends on the level of initial income 
per capita (+), on the initial level of unequality (-), and on the change in this level (-)
14. As a 
result of the first two factors, the income elasticity of poverty (any index) can be expected to 
be lower (in absolute value) when the initial level of poverty is higher. The impact of this 
initial level on changes in poverty, with various specifications, is confirmed by econometric 
tests (Adam 2004, Guillaumont and Korachais 2008). 
 
This has important implications for the contribution of aid to poverty reduction through the 
growth channel. It means that if the aid-growth relationship does not vary with the initial level 
of income (and poverty), this contribution is likely to be smaller when the extent of poverty is 
large. Leading to less aid in very poor countries following to the Collier-Dollar model, and to 
more aid with the Millennium Project model. However it does not hold when the elasticity 





                                                 
12 This opposition can be solved in an appropriate model of optimal allocation (Guillaumont 2008)  
13 Moreover it is probably non linear: suppose everybody lives well below the poverty line, the elasticity of the 
headcount index will be zero, but it will be the same with everybody well above the poverty line, a case which 
can be ignored here. 
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Possible impact of aid on the elasticity (through a change in income distribution) 
 
Another factor in elasticity, as underscored by Bourguignon (2003) and confirmed by the 
previously quoted econometric estimations, should also get attention, namely the change in 
income distribution. If aid has an impact on this change, it could influence the elasticity this 
way. 
   
Very few studies have tried to directly test hypotheses on the effect of aid on the income 
elasticity of poverty (see Verschoor and Kalwij (2006) who consider both the effect of aid and 
that  of  the  budget  share  of  social  services  on  the  elasticity,  without  obtaining  significant 
results for either
15). They find that the aid volume increases the share of social services in the 
budget , an issue to which we come back later. We will see also later that that the income 
elasticity of poverty may depend on the growth volatility (Guillaumont and Korachais 2008) 
and that aid may lower this volatility. 
 
These studies may reflect a more general effect of aid on the change in income distribution, 
which in turn influences the poverty level directly and/or through the income elasticity of 
poverty.  However  cross-sectional  researches  considering  how  aid  influences  the  income 
distribution  are  rather  few  and  their  results  offer  weak  evidence  (Calderon  et  al.  2006, 
Chauvet and Mesple-Somps, 2006).  
 
The impact of aid on poverty through the growth-poverty channel has led to the focus on 
poverty by the traditional indices of monetary poverty. Broadening the concept of poverty 
may lead to different and possibly more positive conclusions. For instance Morrissey (2001) 
argues that probably no more than a third of aid is directed at uses that would be expected to 
have an observable medium-term impact on growth, while other forms of aid can have an 
impact  on  welfare.  For  Gomanee  et  al.  (2005a)  aid  used  to  deliver  health  and  education 
services, can only influence growth in the long term, but can influence aggregate welfare 
immediately. Thus, considering only the growth channel would underestimate the impact of 
aid  on  aggregate  welfare  and  poverty.  We  now  consider  how  aid  can  influence  poverty 
through the public expenditure channel.  
 
 
The public expenditure channel 
 
 
For some who still have doubts about the impact of aid on growth, and in this way, on poverty 
reduction, a major issue for public opinion is what effects aid can have on poverty through its 
impact on public expenditure. By softening the budget constraint aid may induce a higher 
level of expenditures in the social sectors, such as health and education, those which are most 
likely to benefit the poor.  Moreover, if targeted on the social sectors, aid, can directly lead to 
an increase of these expenditures. By financing these expenditures, aid is expected to enhance 
human development, measured by indicators such as child survival or adult literacy. We try to 
review how these various relationships have been tested in cross sectional studies. 
 
Of course, health and education public expenditures, on which the interest of the international 
community has been focused, do not always mainly benefit the poorest, while some other 
public expenditures may have an important effect on their economic situation, for instance 
                                                 
15 They also consider the impact of aid and share of social services on the income elasticity of infant mortality, 
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feeder roads in poor areas and even security expenditures in some cases. But the impact of the 
overall structure of public expenditures on the poor is better assessed on a case by case basis. 
Relying  on  cross-sectional  findings,  we  follow  the  conventional  approach  of  considering 
health and education public expenditures as those most important for the poor. 
 
Following the same approach as in the previous section, we now consider the impact of aid on 
public  social  expenditures  and  the  impact  of  these  expenditures  on  corresponding  social 
outcomes, with special attention to how aid can influence this second phase. 
 
From aid to social public expenditures 
 
We  firstly  consider  the  impact  of  the  total  amount  of  aid  on  public  social  expenditures, 
secondly the effects of aid specifically targeted on such expenditures. A caveat is needed. The 
difficulties of cross country aid growth regressions (heterogeneity, endogeneity) are all still 
present, and often they are not more successfully addressed. In particular the heterogeneity of 
state behaviour is likely to be high.   
 
The impact of the total amount of aid on public social expenditures  
 
The level of public social expenditures depends on the total amount of public revenue and the 
preference given by the recipient country to this kind of expenditure compared to others.  
 
On the risk of crowding out fiscal revenue: the need for dynamic perspective 
  
The total amount of public revenues and expenditure depends on the level of national income 
and  its  growth.  It  may  be  influenced  by  aid,  as  examined  in  the  previous  section,  but 
considered here income as given. It also directly depends on the level of aid. The degree to 
which  additional  aid  is  transformed  into  additional  public  revenue  has  been  debated. 
Numerous works, not reviewed here, have examined to what extent aid increases total public 
revenue, considering possible crowding-out of  domestic sources of revenue.  In the recent 
literature on the impact of aid on public revenue, as pointed out by Morrissey et al. (2006), 
there was “no consistent and robust relationship between aid, the composition of aid, and the 
tax to GDP ratio in developing countries”. However Brun et al. (2008) come to a different 
conclusion, using broader data to measure public revenue and treating aid endogeneity more 
adequately (see supra). As a result, they observe a positive impact of aid (loans or grants) on 
tax effort, instead of crowding out tax revenue. This result is explained by the fact that aid can 
improve the effectiveness of public administrations in order to compensate for the negative 
effect due to additional funding.  
 
The main lesson for this literature is that even when aid weakens the fiscal effort, it only 
partially substitutes for domestic sources of public revenues: the net effect on total public 
revenue is likely to be positive (as appeared to be the net effect of foreign capital inflows on 
investment  in  the  earlier  literature  on  the  possibility  they  were  crowding  out  savings, 
Guillaumont 1985). In other words, even if not one for one, an aid increase generally results 
in a rise in public revenue and expenditure. A positive impact of aid on public revenue is 
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al. 2006)
16, as well as in several country studies using time series analyses (Osei et al. 2005; 
Mavrotas and Ouattara 2006) (for a survey of the literature, see Brun et al. 2008).   
 
Anyway, the issue should also be addressed in a dynamic framework. The level of the tax-
GDP ratio is likely to increase when aid enhances growth, since the marginal ratio is generally 
higher than the average. This effect is here kept aside since the level of income per capita is 
generally controlled for in earlier studies. Moreover the impact of aid on growth can itself be 
reinforced  by  the  stronger  incentives  induced  by  lowering  the  pressure  on  tax  payers, 
particularly small enterprises, and the risk of discriminatory treatment, so visible when the 
state is short of resources (Gunning 2004, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2007). 
 
The public marginal propensity to spend in social and other sectors   
 
We should examine the marginal propensity to dedicate aid receipts to social or pro-poor 
expenditures  ignoring  the  possible  substitution  of  aid  to  domestic  public  revenue.  If  aid 
increases the amount of expenditure dedicated to sectors such as education, health, water 
access and sanitation, it can enhance social outcomes.  
 
Many econometric studies investigate the relationship between the volume of aid and social 
public expenditures, with very different results. Actually they study either the impact of aid 
on the absolute level or relative share of expenditures, which does not at all have the same 
meaning. Aid can contribute to increasing the level of these expenditures (positive marginal 
propensity  to  spend  in  social  sectors),  but  not  to  increasing  their  share  in  all  public 
expenditure (if the aid elasticity of social expenditures is lower than the aid elasticity of all 
public expenditures). Then there is no surprise to find more significant positive results at this 
level than on the share of social expenditure. 
 
The impact at this level is well established in a paper by Mosley et al. (2004): they estimate a 
system  of  equations  using  data  for  some  46  countries  in  the  1990s  and  ﬁnd  that  aid  is 
associated  with  higher  levels  of  pro-poor  spending.  Similar  lessons  may  be  drawn  from 
Audibert et al. (2003): observing important differences in health public spending between 
developing countries, they examine the impact of financial constraints (debt servicing and 
overall budget constraints) on public health spending. They found that these external financial 
constraints have a negative effect on public health spending and that net transfers and grants 
have positive impact. 
 
Three studies suggest that the impact of aid on the share of social or pro poor expenditures 
can  be  positive.  Gomanee  et  al.  (2005a)  argue  that  total  aid  influences  public  spending 
allocations among the different sectors in favour of the social sectors. Gomanee et al. (2005b) 
in  another  paper  find  that  aid  tends  to  increase  pro-poor  expenditure  for  low-income 
countries: they also found that pro-poor expenditure tends to be higher in countries receiving 
more aid, ceteris paribus. Both papers use the lagged aid variable to deal with the endogeneity 
of aid problem. Then, Verschoor and Kalwij (2006) testing the factors affecting the share a 
government allocates to expenditures on social services, found that total aid increases this 
share and aid thus promotes pro-poor growth (1 per cent point increase in total aid leads to a 
0.25 per cent point increase in their share). However, the problem of aid endogeneity is not 
addressed because of limited data.  
                                                 
16 An exception is Gupta et al. (2003) whose results are criticized by Morrissey et al (2006) 
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However, some other econometric studies present results suggesting the absence of impact of 
aid on social expenditures. For instance, Masud and Yontcheva (2005) test the impact of two 
different kinds of aid on public spending between 1990 and 2001, suggesting a substitution 
effect between bilateral aid and public social expenditures. 
 
Effects of aid targeted on social expenditures  
 
A positive impact of total aid on public social expenditure seems all the more likely when a 
large share of aid is targeted on such expenditures. Indeed, aid targeted on social expenditure 
is expected to have a positive effect on these expenditure. However, aid is often considered as 
ultimately fungible within the budget. There is fungibility when aid targeted for a particular 
purpose which would have been financed anyway is freeing resources for another purpose that 
would not have been financed otherwise
17. The debate on aid fungibility is an old one
18. It has 
been revived after the publication of the book Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) where the 
risk of fungibility is presented as an argument against project aid. How far fungibility lessens 
aid effectiveness for poverty reduction is not clear, for several reasons, some are linked to the 
difficulty of assessing the extent of fungibility, and others to uncertainties in the consequences 
of fungibility for poverty reduction. 
 
A brief review of the debate on aid fungibility is required before considering some evidence 
on the link between aid targeted for social purposes and corresponding expenditures. 
 
Assessment of the extent of fungibility: Ambiguous results 
 
Any test of fungibility involves in looking at the (partial) correlation between targeted aid and 
corresponding public expenditure: to what extent does an increase in targeting to health or 
education  result,  ceteris  paribus,  in  increased  health  or  education  public  expenditures? 
Actually there is no convincing evidence of the extent of fungibility, particularly in the social 
sectors.  
 
Two studies, using cross-country panel data and used for supporting the view presented in 
Assessing Aid, are often quoted. One is Feyzioglu et al. (1998) who found that aid is fungible 
in  agriculture,  education  and  energy,  but  not  in  the  transport  and  communication  sectors 
where aid leads to a one-for-one increase in public spending. The Word Bank’s own study (by 
Devarajan et al., 1999), focused on African countries (where fungibility was suspected to be 
the cause of aid ineffectiveness) concluded that aid is partially fungible. However, these two 
studies have been criticized because the sectoral aid data used only include concessional loans 
(due to availability), while grants represent two thirds of sectoral aid (Berg, 2003; Lensink 
and White, 2000).  
 
New  panel  studies  from  the  IMF  still  give  an  ambiguous  picture.  Masud  and  Yontcheva 
(2005) found bilateral aid to be fungible (58 counties considered from 1990 to 2001), but, 
more interesting for our purpose, Mishra and Newhouse (2007) focusing on health aid  (118 
countries from 1973 to 2004), concluded that aid targeted at health does not appear fungible. 
                                                 
17 Fungibility is said to occur when the marginal increase in sectoral expenditure following the receipt of aid is 
lower than the marginal amount of foreign aid dedicated to this particular sector. Fungibility can be total, if aid 
does not have any impact on the targeted sector, or partial, if the impact is lower than the total amount of aid 
affected. 
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Doubling health aid is associated with a 7 per cent increase in health spending per capita (for 
the average country, rising aid by one dollar increases public health spending by $1.5). 
 
Besides these panel studies, some older country studies using time-series data
19 also produced  
ambiguous results, while Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) found no evidence of fungibility (in 
Philippines, Costa Rica and Pakistan).  
 
Finally, it remains difficult to econometrically test the fungibility of sectoral aid and there is 
even less evidence of fungibility of aid targeted at social sectors compared to aid targeted at 
other sectors.  
 
Implications of fungibility: When fungible does not mean less effective 
 
Even when fungible according to the meaning given in the previous studies, aid targeted at 
social sectors may be effective in improving these sectors. The relevance of fungibility for our 
purpose may then be overestimated.  
 
First, even when aid targeted at specific social expenditures appears fungible, it does not 
necessarily mean that its use is less pro poor. It is conceivable that the government takes the 
opportunity from targeted assistance to finance expenditures for the international fashions of 
the  day,  but  are  “pro-poor”  in  the  country  context  (for  instance  agriculture).  The  result 
depends on the government use of freed resources. 
 
Second, it could be that a part of sectoral aid may not be channelled through the budget and is 
then not likely to increase (budget) public expenditure correspondingly. If in this case there is 
fungibility  in  budget  expenditures,  targeted  aid  should  not  result  in  improved  sectoral 
outcomes but in the converse case, it should. Thus, the existence of a link between targeted 
aid and corresponding sectoral outcomes suggests the absence of full fungibility (direct and 
indirect). A striking result of some cross-sectional studies is that public aid targeted at social 
sectors such as health or education evidences more easily produces this aid impact on the 
sectors themselves than on the corresponding public expenditures. For instance, investigating 
the impact of aid on school enrolment, Dreher et al. (2008) find that aid allocated to education 
does  not  lead  to  an  increase  of  public  expenditures  for  education  (fungibility),  but  has  a 
positive impact on enrolment.
20  
 
The relevance of fungibility may also be challenged for a third reason. Even if fungible in 
terms  of  sectoral  allocation,  aid  targeted  at  social  or  pro-poor  expenditures  may  have  a 
technical  content  making  its  implementation  different  from  that  of  domestically  financed 
expenditures in the same sector. Beyond the transfer of money, targeted aid may thus bring 
ideas and know-how. Conditionality and technical assistance may be used to reinforce this 
effect. Pettersson (2007) found sectoral aid fungible in a sample of 57 aid-recipient countries 
but did not find any evidence of non-fungible sectoral aid working better than fungible aid. 
 
                                                 
19 Pack and Pack found fungibility in Indonesia (1990), but not in the Dominican Republic (1993). 
20 Another example, different but leading to a similar conclusion, is given by a paper of Mishra and Newhouse 
(2007):  finding the impact of total aid on health outcomes is relatively low and not significant whereas the 
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In conclusion, what matters is whether fungibility results in lower aid effectiveness in the 
target sectors. The existing literature does not allow any definitive conclusion on this matter.   
 
From social expenditures to social outcomes: The role of aid 
 
Following the public expenditure channel, aid effectiveness for poverty reduction involves 
both an aid impact on public expenditures and an impact of public expenditures on poverty. 
Paradoxically in the cross section literature, the latter is debated.   But  the debate can be 
enlightened by the consideration of the role of aid in this relationship. After reviewing the 
debate, we examine the effects of aid, both global and targeted, on social outcomes in so far 
as they are supposed to result from public expenditures (in or out of the budget). Then, we 
review the micro-economic research on impact analysis to address the link between social 
expenditures and corresponding social outcomes. Finally, we underscore the impact of budget 
support on social outcomes depends on the kind of conditionality applied. 
 
The social expenditure-outcomes puzzle: a failure of cross sectional studies? 
 
Despite  a  vast  macro-economic  literature,  the  impact  of  public  expenditures  on  social 
outcomes is still debated, and for health even more than for education. As for health, no 
relationship was found by several studies summarized by Musgrove (1996), as well as by 
Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Wagstaff and Claeson (2004), while Bokhari et al (2007) 
found a positive link. As for education, weak or insignificant link is also reported by some 
studies  (Roberts  2003,  Dreher  et  al.  2008).  Why  increased  public  health  or  education 
expenditures could not result in an improvement of the main health or education indicators 
associated with the  MDGs? Several issues are raised by this question. 
  
First, public expenditures may be biased in favour of the rich. For example, Morrisson (2002) 
argue  that,  in  Madagascar  and  Tanzania,  education  and  health  services  did  not  primarily 
benefit the poor. In addition, services for the por were mostly of lower quality. Castro-Leal et 
al. (1999) showed that increasing social expenditures in Africa did not benefit the poor and 
did  not  guarantee  welfare  improved  welfare  because  of  unequal  distribution  of  benefits. 
Berthelemy (2006) argued that public education public expenditures are not necessarily pro-
poor as they are mainly for secondary and tertiary education and are biased against primary 
education in most African economies, leading to an unequal distribution of human capital. 
Similar findings for health expenditures are evidenced by Berthelemy and Seban 2009.  
 
Some other authors have identified cases in which public social expenditures have been pro-
poor. For instance, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) underline (on the case of India) that the 
benefits of public expenditures are becoming more pro-poor when social programs expand, 
early benefits being captured by non-poor. Similar non-linearities have been noted as for the 
income elasticity of poverty, which is lower, the higher the initial extent of poverty (cf supra). 
 
Second there may be leakages between the initial state disbursements and the final delivery of 
the corresponding social service (Reinikka and Svensson 2001, Gauthier and Wane 2008).  
 
One can also wonder which type of expenditure benefit the most the poor? For instance,   
expenditures  dedicated  to  agriculture  are  generally  pro-poor,  as  found  by  Mosley  and 
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Finally  the  weakness  of  the  correlation  between  public  social  expenditures  and  social 
outcomes  may  result  from  the  general  problems  discussed  above  about  the  aid–growth 
relationship (well emphasized by Deaton, 2009): the problem of endogeneity that necessitates 
special treatments (i.e. the use of instrumental variables) and the problem of heterogeneity, 
that  needs  to  condition  the  effect  to  he  level  of  another  variable  (i.e.,  the  use  of  a 
multiplicative variable). The Deaton “misunderstanding use of exogeneity” and “handling of 
heterogeneity” are the two main issues to be considered.  
 
The effects of aid on social outcomes: are public social expenditures more effective when 
supported by aid? 
 
Aid  can  benefit  the  poor  without  necessarily  having  any  impact  on  monetary  or  income 
poverty, since aid can finance expenditures that improve the welfare of the poor, such as 
universal access to primary education and health care. Therefore most empirical analyses of 
the impact of aid on poverty refer to non-monetary indicators of welfare, such as education 
and health status indicators. We focus on the effects of aid targeted to the educational sector, 
then to those of aid dedicated to the health sector.  
 
We have already noted that targeted aid has clearer effects on social outcomes (health and 
education) than on corresponding public budget social expenditures, either because they are 
not channelled through the budget or because, when they are, they may be both fungible and 
more productive. It appears that aid, in particular targeted aid, has clearer effects than public 
social expenditures on social outcomes. These paradoxes suggest that the public expenditure 
channel through which aid can contribute to poverty reduction should not be examined only 
for its impact on the size of the flows, but also as a factor of enhancing productivity in social 
sectors. 
 
Let us take as an example supporting this hypothesis a paper by Gomanee et al. (2005b): they 
tested the direct effect of aid on welfare or poverty for a sample of 104 countries and found a 
positive direct impact on the quality of life, measured by HDI, and on infant mortality, but no 
impact of public social spending, although they found that aid tends to increase pro-poor 
expenditures for low-income countries.  
 
 
Aid to education. Cross sectional studies of the impact of aid on the educational sector are still 
limited. Two main studies provide recent information on this issue
21. 
 
Michaleowa and Weber (2007) has investigated the relationship between aid to the education 
sector and primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments, using aid data from DAC. As 
for outcomes, they use primary completion rates and gross enrolment rates for secondary and 
tertiary levels. Estimations done either with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) or 
fixed effects show a rather small impact of aid on school performance at all levels. However, 
the results may be under-estimated because of data problems disaggregating aid. 
 
In a major study Dreher et al. (2008) found an important and robust positive impact of aid 
targeted at education on primary school enrolment. In a panel of 105 countries for the period 
1970-2005, they estimate the impact of aid for the education sector (measured as a percentage 
                                                 
21Wolf (2007) also finds a positive impact of aid targeted to education on literacy, primary completion rate for a 
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of  GDP)  on  net  primary  school  enrolment,  with  three  methods  (GMM  system,  SUR  and 
3SLS). They found an important and robust effect. 
 
To be noted, these results do not hold when considering aggregate aid as the explanatory 
variable, what is consistent with our hypothesis of the specific productivity of aid targeted at 
social  sectors.  Anyway  these  studies  confirm  the  need  to  disaggregate  aid  to  measure  its 
effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction.  
 
Aid to health. The impact of targeted aid on health outcomes has mainly been examined with 
reference to infant or child mortality. Let us refer to some recent studies, done after that of 
Gomanee (2005b) quoted above. 
 
Mishra and Newhouse (2007), found a statistically significant, but small effect that doubling 
per capita health aid was associated with a 2 percent reduction in the infant mortality rate for 
118  countries  between  1973  and  2004.  However  the  Country  Reporting  System  (CRS) 
database used are for aid  commitments, not disbursements, with very limited coverage at the 
beginning of the period. Wolf (2007) also found a positive impact of aid targeted to health on 
infant mortality, and on child (under-five) mortality. 
 
Also using the CRS commitments database (from the 1980s), Chauvet et al. (2008) found a 
non-linear impact of health aid on infant mortality, decreasing with income per capita. Hence, 
aid allocated to the health sector should be more effective in the poorest countries.  
 
 
Knowledge transfer: Lessons from micro studies and impact analyse 
 
If aid for the social sectors induces increased productivity in these sectors, the effect is likely 
to depend on knowledge of best practices. Since such progress is costly, it is often associated 
with aid operations, often financed by (public or private) aid. Macroeconomic analysis of aid 
effectiveness  for  poverty  reduction  cannot  be  disconnected  from  improvements  in  the 
microeconomic  analysis  of  the  effectiveness  of  specific  public  projects,  programmes  or 
expenditures. The main improvements are briefly reviewed below.  
  
What can be expected from impact analysis 
 
A growing micro-economic literature uses new techniques of impact analysis, designed as   
randomized  trials  or  evaluations  addressing  the  endogeneity  problem  encountered  in 
macroeconomics (see an assessment by Deaton 2009). Proponents of randomized evaluations 
claim  that  this  method  has  eliminated  the  problem  of  mining  data  and  is  rich  in  policy 
implications. Nevertheless, as underscored by Deaton, random evaluation results cannot be 
extrapolated to other settings. It is not known in which situations a project works and what the 
results will be in a different and uncontrolled situation
22. For Duflo et al. (2008), randomized 
trials  can  be  multiplied  in  order  to  deduce  general  results.  What  is  the  number  of  trials 
                                                 
22 “The price for this success (of randomized controlled trials) is a focus that is too narrow to tell us “what 
works” in development, to design policy, or to advance scientific  knowledge about development processes. 
Project evaluation using randomized controlled trials is unlikely to discover the elusive keys to development, nor 
to be the basis for a cumulative research program that might progressively lead to a better understanding of 
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necessary  to  generalize  results?  What  part  of  aid  should  be  dedicated  to  these  costly 





Where lessons can be drawn for poverty reduction 
 
The  micro  level  evidence  on  social  impacts  is  growing  concerning  health  or  education 
operations or programmes. Such social technologies have improved with such investments, 
possibly financed by aid, but not due to the fact of aid financing, compared to another one 
(mainly domestic budget).  
 
A major area of impact analysis has been education. There has been significant progress made 
in increasing enrolments (the second Millennium Development Goal), but they are limited 
both by corresponding cost increases and often by  high drop out rates. Impact analyses have 
helped to evaluate the usefulness of various programmes focused on reducing costs and/or  
drop out rates
24. In particular they have shown the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers 
(CCT thereafter) programs, consisting in giving money to the parents conditional on child 
school attendance, as children are often used to cope risk when households are exposed to 
shocks (de Janvry et al., 2006). PROGRESA, a famous programme implemented in Mexico 
has been shown to have positively affected school enrolment (Schultz, 2004). Impact analyses 
have also shown the effectiveness of other interventions to increase school attendance
25.  
 
As primary school enrolment is growing quickly, another challenge is to make  children learn 
effectively. Low achievement is not only linked to high drop-out rates. Numerous tools can be 
used  to  enhance  schooling  quality  such  as  teacher  preparation  and  reducing  teacher 
absenteeism with financial incentives. In order to know which tools are more effective in 
improving school quality, impact studies are both still needed and difficult, because long and 
costly, since the trial experiment should be conducted until the completion of schooling. 
 
Impact  analyses  for  health  (as  well  as  many  studies  conducted  in  this  field  before  the 
extension  randomized  experiments
26)  are  also  useful,  bringing  rich  information  for  health 
policy, in particular for preventive policy, such as immunization. Recent impact studies (with 
trial  experiment)  have  noticeably  shown  the  high  level  of  price  elasticity  of  demand  for 
preventive goods and services, then the usefulness of a system of incentives (for instance for 
the price of deworming drugs in Kenya, Kremer et al. (2004), or insecticide treated bednets in 
Kenya Cohen and Dupas, (2008), for picking up results of HIV tests in Malawi, Thornton, 
(2008), or for immunization in India, Banerjee et al. (2008). 
 
                                                 
23 To quote Easterly (2008), randomized evaluations are “far from being a panacea in development, or even just 
to “make aid work,” and the randomized experiments proponents overstate their potential”. 
24 See for example, Duflo et al. (2008) on the effects of the distribution of uniforms in Kenya where the purchase 
of uniforms is the only school expenditure: they find that it leads to a significant reduction of drop-out rates. 
25Another program that has encouraged school attendance for girls is merit scholarships for girls in Kenya. The 
random experiment processed by Kremer et al. (2004) show a positive effect on school enrolment, better results 
for these girls and also some externalities to boys' performance in the same classroom. 
Miguel et Kremer (2004) also show that absenteeism in Kenya was reduced by 25% following a mass treatment 
with deworming drugs, they also point out the huge externalities for children and school that did not receive the 
treatment. Such a randomized trial evidences that in this case deworming is the most cost-eﬀective way to 
increase school enrollment.  
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The impact of global budget support according by type of conditionality  
 
An increasing share of ODA is delivered as budget support. Commitments, and especially 
disbursements of this kind of aid, as with balance of payment support, are generally linked to 
“conditions” the recipient country should meet. The traditional type of conditionality involves 
specific economic policies the country should follow (ostensibly to grow or reduce poverty, 
etc.)  and  includes  specific  policy  measures.  In  the  last  two  decades  such  policy 
conditionalities have been repeatedly criticized as ineffective, arbitrary, inconsistent with the 
promotion of ownership, (an issue more recently underlined by the Paris Declaration, and of 
democracy. Proposals have emerged from the mid-nineties to substitute with conditionality 
based on outcomes or results policy traditional conditionality based on policy instruments (see 
Collier  et  al.  1997,  Guillaumont  and  Guillaumont  Jeanneney  1995,  2006,  Kanbur  2005). 
Some  changes  have  occurred  in  practice,  with  increasing  concern  to  promote  national 
ownership,  particularly  following  an  initiative  of  the  European  Commission  (explained 
below), but they remain limited. 
 
The kind of conditionality applied has significant implications for the likely contribution of 
budget support to poverty reduction. 
 
It  first  should  be  noted  that  the  criticism  of  the  traditional  conditionality  was  initially 
consistent with what we have called above the ABCD paradigm, although the perspective has 
evolved over time. We remember that a corollary of the Burnside-Dollar model was that (the 
amount of) aid was without effect on policy, implying a critique of traditional conditionality. 
The logical consequence was to  replace the policy-based  conditionality with policy-based 
selectivity (in total aid allocation) with the view of increasing aid effectiveness. But as far as 
the empirical basis for the model  (effectiveness dependent on policy) appeared weakened, the 
message became to use selectivity based on policy as an incentive for the adoption of good 
policies…Thus  the  message  became  closer  to  the  traditional  view  of  the  policy  based 
conditionality. And the border between policy based conditionality (for budget support) and 
selectivity  became  even  less  clear  as  for  aid  targeted  at  social  outcomes  (whether  or  not 
passing through budget support). 
27  
 
Conditionality is supposedly favourable to the poor when, in the context of the MDGs, donors 
evidenced high aversion to poverty and put pressure on recipient countries to increase the 
social  expenditures  in  their  budget  and  take  other  appropriate  measures  in  these  sectors. 
However,  the  usual  criticism  still  seems  valid:  national  ownership  is  weakened  and 
effectiveness uncertain (for instance, health expenditures can be increased, without improving 
child mortality rates). 
 
The  European  Commission  has  partially  reformed  its  conditionality  and  adopts  a 
“performance-based” approach for a part of its budget support. This consists of determining a 
part  of  the  global  support  according  to  results  or  outcome  indicators,  instead  of  policy 
measures. This approach comes with some advantages it encourages national “ownership” of 
political reforms, but also improves transparency and coordination among donors. However, 
such ex post conditionality remains based on “performance” indicators intermediate between 
                                                 
27 There is mitigated evidence that aid targeted to social sectors is more effective when macroeconomic policy 
and  institutions  are  “good”:  Mishra  and  Newhouse  (2007)  find  that  health  aid  has  been  more  effective  in 
reducing infant mortality in countries with better policies and institutions; Dreher et al. (2008) (as Gomanee et 
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policy measures and outcome indicators, such as the number of schools built or public health 
facility attendance, rather than indicators of final impact on poverty, such as the reduction of 
child mortality or the improvement in the real literacy (Adam et al. 2004).  
 
Genuine performance-based conditionality would rely on improvements in MDG indicators. 
This kind of conditionality can improve both national ownership and the impact of aid on 
poverty reduction. However, the reform towards this ex post conditionality will take time and 




The stabilization channel: aid as a factor dampening vulnerability  
 
At the macroeconomic level, a major effect that can be expected from aid is due to its possible 
stabilizing impact. The reason is simple. Exogeneous sources of instability, either external or 
natural, and the growth volatility they induce are significant factors lowering average growth. 
They also contribute to higher inequality, making growth less favourable to the poor. If aid 
does stabilize income growth, it is likely to enhance growth and to make it more pro-poor. To 
present this neglected, but essential effect of aid on poverty, we first suggest how to assess the 
stabilizing  impact  of  aid,  then  how  it  influences  the  working  of  the  previous  channels 
examined,  in  particular  how  it  conditions  the  effects  of  aid  on  growth,  and  how,  by 
influencing the distribution of income, it conditions the impact of growth on the reduction of 
poverty. By these two ways the stabilizing impact of aid constitutes a third channel from aid 
to  poverty.  It  also  could  influence  the  public  expenditure  pattern,  reinforcing  this  third 
channel, but we do not here examine this influence, due to a lack of empirical evidence. 
 
 
The stabilizing impact of aid: how to assess 
 
There has been a recent growing concern about aid instability and unpredictability. Aid has 
even been criticized for “pro-cyclicity” with regard to public revenue, what may not be very 
meaningful due to the endogeneity of this revenue. And, even if there is some ground for the 
concern about unpredictability, it does not involve that aid has a destabilizing macroeconomic 
impact. Empirical evidence rather suggests the opposite. 
 
 There are two main ways by  which the stabilizing or destabilizing impact of aid can be 
assessed (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2008, Guillaumont 2006).  
 
The first one is to compare the evolution of aid to that of the exogeneous flow the most likely 
to be a source of instability in low income countries, the export of goods and services. To see 
whether  aid is stabilizing with regard to exports, an index is built an index which is the 
difference between the index for volatility of exports and the index for the volatility of the 
aggregate flow “aid plus exports”. Aid is generally stabilizing when it is countercyclical, but 
also  in  some  cases  when  it  is  pro-cyclical,  if  its  cycle  is  dampened  compared  to  that  of 
exports.   From 1970 to 1999, aid appears to have been stabilizing in 71 per cent of cases.  
 
The second more general method, taking into account all the sources of exogeneous shocks is 
to estimate a model of the instability of national income (or of growth volatility) including the 
aid to GDP ratio as an explanatory variable. The coefficient of this variable is found to be 
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report with the EVI control variable confirms this result, as well as evidencing a significant 
and  positive coefficient for EVI
28in a growth volatility regression. 
 
In conclusion, even if aid instability may have a harmful character in some cases, the average 
level of aid is a factor of macroeconomic stability in most cases. 
 
 
The more aid is stabilizing, the more it is growth enhancing 
 
In the discussion of factors conditioning aid effectiveness for growth, we have suggested that 
aid may be more effective in countries exposed to strong and/or recurrent exogenous shocks. 
This argument can be briefly presented in two steps. 
 
Structural vulnerability is harmful for growth. 
 
It  is  well  established  that  macroeconomic  instability  has  harmful  consequences  for 
development (see a review in Guilaumont 2006). Indeed, numerous works have shown the 
negative effect on the average growth of income either of income growth instability (Ramey 
and Ramey, 1995; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005; Norrbin and Yigit, 2005), or of specific 
exogeneous  instabilities,  more  particularly  export  instability,  especially  in  Africa 
(Guillaumont  et  al.  1999).  The  negative  effects  of  instability  on  growth  come  both  from 
uncertainty and risk-aversion (ex ante effect) and from asymmetric responses to positive and 
negative shocks (ex post effect). As income growth is a major factor in poverty reduction (cf 
supra) income instability hurts the poor through its negative effect on income growth. 
 
Aid  effectiveness  higher  in  vulnerable  countries:  aid  enhances  growth  by  dampening 
instability 
 
If  aid  contributes  to  dampening  the  degree  of  income  instability,  it  can  be  expected  to 
contribute to faster growth. We have developed and tested this hypothesis in different ways in 
three  previous  papers  (Guillaumont  and  Chauvet,  2001;  Chauvet  and  Guillaumont,  2004, 
2008)
29. As seen above, following the debate opened by Burnside and Dollar (2000), it is 
clear that aid effectiveness is likely to be conditional on specific features of the receiving 
countries  (an  interactive  term  between  the  aid  variable  and  the  feature  of  interest  being 
expected to capture this conditional effect).  
 
Here the feature is structural vulnerability, measured in one way or another. Various measures 
of vulnerability have been used (composite indices or only instability of exports of goods and 
services), with different specifications, control variables, instrumentation, etc. In all cases, 
while  the  structural  vulnerability  variable  had  a  negative  effect  on  economic  growth,  it 
increased aid effectiveness: aid is more effective in more vulnerable countries: in other words, 
aid  dampens  the  negative  effect  of  vulnerability  on  growth.  Moreover,  it  seems  that 
vulnerability  (instability)  enhances  the  absorptive  capacity,    as  evidenced  by  a  higher 
threshold for negative marginal returns of aid  when vulnerability is high (Wagner 2008).  
 
 Additional support for these macroeconomic tests, subject to the usual limitations of growth 
regressions, have come from “meso-analysis”  of the factors determining the rate of success of 
World Bank projects. Vulnerable countries appear less exposed to decreasing returns from 
                                                 
28 On-going research. 
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projects when the aid level increases (Guillaumont and Laajaj, 2006). It is another way of 
saying that aid enhances the absorptive capacity. 
 
 
4.3. The more aid is stabilizing, the more growth is pro-poor 
  
Macroeconomic instability is harmful for poverty, through income distribution 
 
It is also reasonable to suppose that, for a given income, macroeconomic instability influences 
income distribution and then poverty.  Instability  may increase inequalities because of the 
asymmetry of responses to positive and negative shocks, depending on whether people are 
initially rich or poor: poor and near poor people are more vulnerable to instability than richer 
people. They have less diversified sources of income, are less skilled and less mobile between 
sectors and areas (Laursen and Mahajan, 2005)). Likewise, they have little access to credit 
and insurance markets and depend more on public transfers and social services (Guillaumont 
Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2005). The inability of poor people to face negative shock result in 
losses of human capital, which are difficult to reverse, e.g. nutritional status (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2000, for Ethiopia), or removing children from school (Thomas et al., 2004, for 
Indonesia).  
 
There are a few cross-country econometric analyses of instability on inequality have been 
performed. Laursen and Mahajan (2005) find a negative effect of income instability on the 
poorest quintile, while for Breen and Garcia-Penalosa (2005) the next to last quintile (rather 
than the last one) appears to be the most affected, suggesting that almost poor people may 
become durably poor under unstable conditions.  
 
 Besides income instability affecting poverty reduction through its effect on income growth, 
instability  also  affects  poverty  reduction  by  increasing  inequalities.  Such  an  effect  is 
evidenced by Guillaumont and Korachais (2008)
30: when income instability increased by one 
percentage point over a six year period, then the poverty (headcount) level increased by about 
one percentage point on average. Similarly, Guillaumont et al. (2008) find negative effects of 
macroeconomic instability (income volatility and primary instabilities) on child survival, once 
controlled for the effects on income level
31. 
 
4.3.2. A potential contribution to pro-poor growth? 
 
If macro economic instability generates poverty and if aid has a stabilizing impact, it follows 
that aid thus contribute to poverty reduction. This potential effect is particularly important in 
the present context of word financial and economic turmoil. The risk is high that vulnerable 
low  income  countries  will  be  badly  affected  by  the  world  recession  (through  commodity 
prices,  migrant  remittances,  foreign  direct  investment,  etc.).  Many  people  within  these 
countries are at the risk of becoming poorer or falling into poverty traps. In that perspective 
the evolution of aid flows may have a crucial role. If sustained, they will be an important 
stabilizing factor, all the more that it will be possible to implement compensatory finance 
schemes. Aid will then work as an insurance. But if aid flows are also affected by the crisis, 
they can cease to be stabilizing and even contribute to the countries’ difficulties. Anyway, 
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current concerns are very far from the concern a few years ago of the risk of Dutch disease 




Conclusion: How to make aid more "poverty reducing" 
 
 
The main policy conclusions of the proceeding review of the channels through which aid 
contributes  to  poverty  reduction  can  be  summarized  in  a  few  principles  (see  details  in 
Guillaumont 2008, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2006, 2007). 
 
1)  Reforming aid allocation criteria with regard to the poverty  MDG.  Aid allocation 
criteria particularly those of the multilateral development banks, should be adapted to better 
reflect both the needs of recipient countries and potential effectiveness. It involves taking 
structural vulnerability into account.  
 
2)   Improving compensatory finance schemes. To reinforce the stabilizing impact of aid, 
likely to have important consequences on poverty in the present world economic context, as 
well as its predictability, compensatory finance should be mobilized quickly and effectively. 
Although some schemes have been recently reformed, further reforms are needed. 
 
3)   Targeting  more  effectively.  For  targeting  to  be  effective  for  poverty  reduction,  it 
should  meet  two  conditions.  One  is  to  balance  the  search  for  supporting  growth  and  
reinforcing  public  social  expenditures,  without  limiting  to  the  latter.  The  second  one  is   
through targeting on social expenditures, to increase the transfer of knowledge on efficient 
and equitable delivery of social services. 
 
4)  Moving  to  results-based  conditionality.  Both  to  reinforce  ownership  and  to  make 
budget support more effective for poverty reduction, the move towards conditionality based 
on final poverty outcomes or the impact on health and education should be accelerated.   
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Annex  : Summary of some previous econometric results supporting the points made in 
the paper  
 
 
  Equations  Estimator  Source 
 
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i
AidStab ODA Vol ODA
Vol Inc G
, , , ,
, 1 , ,
* * * 008 . 0 * 0002 . 0 002 . 0
* * * 008 . 0 * * * 041 . 1 185 . 0
+ + −
− + − = −  
 
 
G: growth of GDP per capita 
Inc: Ln of income per capita 
Vol: Volatility of exportations 
ODA: Net aid disbursements as a percentage of GDP 
AidStab: stabilizing character of aid = Volatility of exports – 












Chauvet, L. and Guillaumont,  
P. (2008). Aid, volatility and 
growth again. UNU-WIDER 
Research Paper No. 2008/78. 





t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
AC ODA EV GNP ODA SPI GNP ODA
Pol GNP ODA Pol GNP ODA
GNP ODA AC EV SPI
Pol Pol Inc Inc
, , , , , ,
1 , , , ,
, , , ,
1 , , 1 , ,
* 818 . 17 * / * * 918 . 19 * / * * 165 . 16
* / * * * 131 . 7 * / * * 622 . 7
/ * * * 139 . 2 * * * 491 . 0 * * * 971 . 1 116 . 0
* * * 005 . 1 * * * 579 . 0 * * * 581 . 0 * * * 022 . 0
+ + −
− +
− + − +
+ + + =
−
− −  
 
Inc: Ln of income per capita 
Pol: Economic policy (weighted sum of an inflation variable 
and an openness policy variable) 
SPI: Political instability (weighted  sum of the number of  coups 
d’état, of the number of demonstrations and of a dummy equals 
to one when a civil war breaks out) 
EV: Economic vulnerability (weighted sum of the trend of terms 
of trade and exports of goods and services instability) 
AC: Absorptive capacity (weighted  sum of the electricity 
generating capacity and of the second level educational 
attainment of the total population aged 15 and over) 













Chauvet, L., and P. 
Guillaumont (2004). ‘Aid and 
Growth Revisited: Policy, 
Economic Vulnerability and  
Political Instability’. In B. 
Tungodden, N. Stern and I. 
Kolstad (eds), Toward ProPoor 
Policies—Aid, Institutions and 
Globalization. Annual World 
Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, 
Europe. Washington, DC: 
World Bank and New York: 








t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i
t i t i t i
t i t i t i
P ODA E ODA ODA
P Ei Frag
Pol GDP M Pop
Sch GDP Dummy G
, , , , ,
, , ,
1 , 1 , ,
, , ,
* 018 . 0 * * * 13 . 0 * * 84 . 0
* * * 94 . 0 * * * 66 . 0 * * * 07 . 2
56 . 2 / 2 * * * 062 . 0 * * * 81 . 0








G: GDP growth per capita 
GDP: Log of initial GDP per capita 
Sch: Average years of schooling, initial 
Pop: Rate of population growth 
M2/GDP: Financial depth (lagged) 
Pol: Political instability (lagged) 
Frag: Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 
E: Low vulnerability indicator (weighted sum of agricultural 
added value and of real value of exports instabilities, trend of 
terms of trade and log of initial population) 
P: Policy indicator (weighted sum of the inflation rate, the 
budget surplus and trade-openness) 









Guillaumont, P. and Chauvet, 
L. (2001). Aid and 
performance: A reassessment. 
The Journal of Development 
Studies, 37(6), 66-92 
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* * 012 . 0 * * * * 428 . 0
* * * 628 . 23 * * * * 111 . 0 * * * 665 . 5































Pov: Poverty headcount (% of population) 
Pov
Pov ∆  : Relative poverty change 
Inc: Average income per capita 
Pov0 : Initial poverty headcount 
G
G ∆  : Relative Gini change 
Ins: Income instability 





effects for a 
sample of 70 
countries 







Guillaumont, P. and Korachais, 
C. (2008). When unstable, 
growth is less pro poor. 
Document de travail de la série 








poverty    
Impact of instability on child survival 
 
t i t i t i t i Vacc Inc Ins Surv , , 1 , , * * 135 . 0 * * * 868 . 0 * * * 096 . 0 * * * 560 . 4 + + − − = −  
 
t i t i




, 1 , ,
110 . 0 * * 202 . 0
* * * 789 . 0 * * 082 . 0 * * * 350 . 4
+ +
+ − − = −  
 
Surv: Logit of under-five survival rate 
Ins: Instability of per capita income 
Inc: Ln of GDP per capita 
Vacc: Ln of rate of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) 
vaccination of children less than one year of age 




based on a 
panel of 97 
developing 
countries 




Guillaumont, P., Korachais, C., 
and Subervie, J. (2008). How 
Macroeconomic Instability 
Lowers Child Survival. UNU-
WIDER Conference on 
Advancing Health Equity 
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